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HISPANICS DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

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Between 1950 and 2016, nearly [one million](#) Latin Americans killed each other, either as fighters for communism or as defenders of order. In the mid-1970s, almost all Latin American states were in bloody conflict. Costa Rica came to its senses first, but only after the brutal civil war of 1948. Still, Costa Rica's murder rate ranks in the [top sixth](#) of the world. Killings without ideological camouflage caused another [2.5 million victims](#) between 2000 and 2016 alone. Thus, five million violent deaths in Latin America since 1950 is a realistic estimate.

The reasons for this bloodbath are still not clear. But answers may emerge when we look at the [war index](#) for Latin America, which in 1970 was between 3 and 6: i.e. for every 1,000 men between 55 and 59 years of age, there are 3,000 to 6,000 young men between [15 and 19 years of age](#). This younger cohort eagerly takes up the struggle for jobs and status, but quickly realizes that the ambitious offspring is much more numerous than the positions vacated by the elderly. In order to climb to the top quickly, ever more youths become enthusiastic about the armed struggle.

The basic cause of this turmoil can be found – peaking between 1945 and 1975 – in Latin America's fertility rate of [five to six children](#) per woman's life. In the half century 1950-2000, between Tierra del Fuego and the Caribbean, these children inflated the population from 167 to 523 million. Ángel María Bautista Castro Argiz (1875-1956), father of Fidel Castro (1926-2016), raised five sons and four daughters, but had only one sugar cane farm to leave to his children. Those who didn't inherit had to struggle for land of their own. Fidel took Cuba. What Western student movements glorified at the time, but governments feared, was a malignant demographic growth that masked its youthful drive and raw greed with slogans of progress and humanity.

Much more serious for Washington than the Latino coups d'état and revolutions becomes a movement that slows down the killing and could actually be reason for joy. It is formed by [twenty million](#) young people who release pressure from the murderous cauldron in the South by moving to the USA. Settling north relieves population pressures south of the border, but increases these pressures inside the USA, where the 20 million quickly multiply to nearly 62 million, raising the United States into third place among Latin nations, behind Brazil and Mexico. Demographics tell the story. Between 1900 and 2020 the US population increased by a factor of nearly 4.5 (75 to 332 million) and the Latin American population by a factor of 9. The Hispanic population in the USA exploded by a factor of 120 (0.6 to 62 million).

On the other side of the Atlantic a comparable development is provided by the two to three million people who have left Turkey. Between 1955 and 2010, Turkey's population grew from 24 to 74 million. Most Turkish emigrants went to Europe. Their exodus helped reduce the death toll in the endless Anatolian fighting which has continued since 1968 and which has taken at least 50,000 to 60,000 lives. Those who escaped from Turkey tripled their number, increasing to [seven million](#). Of the Turks in Germany, even today, [three times](#) as many live on welfare than of the indigenous population.

Can its massively growing Hispanic minority help to strengthen the USA's weakening competitiveness in relation to East Asia? This outcome is unlikely, because the new immigrants come from regions with an average cognitive ability (CA; [Rindermann scale](#)) of 80-90, while the Asian challengers have CA 102-104. In the 2015 TIMSS mathematics comparisons, 142 out of 1,000 US ten-year-olds make it into the best group ("[advanced](#)"). East Asians, however, more than double this figure with 320 in Japan to 500 in Singapore. And in terms of absolute population, the Chinese (including diaspora), Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese are even five times larger than the US (around 1,800 to around 350 million [including illegals]).

This means that a smart kid in the US now competes with twelve East Asians who are at least as clever. Just how difficult this disparity will be for the US economy became

apparent 2019, when the three leading East Asian competitors alone beat the USA in the PCT patent applications – after only one-sixth of the American performance in [1994](#) – by [131,000 to 58,000](#). In Latin America and the Caribbean, however, the figure is only 2,500, while fifty million South Koreans (over 19,000) manage almost eight times as many as Latin America which, demographically, is thirteen times larger.

But that single talented North American must not only keep his or her country in the global economic race against twelve smart East Asians, he or she must also pay for fellow countrymen of the same age who are unable to find work on the labor market. In the Corona year 2020, [37 percent](#) of Hispanic households depended on food stamps. While they cannot contribute to the sharpening of America's competitive edge, they require a lot of support from the dwindling percentage of the population that is actively trying to hold this front. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee for the providers of countless billions in welfare money that they will be protected against arson, looting or accusations of racism.

East Asia's 12:1 talent advantage of 2015 – whose cognitive basis has been known to economists and scholars at least since [1980](#) – has turned into an even greater advantage: In the 2018 PISA mathematics test, the USA is now only ranked 38th, in 2003 it was [nineteenth](#). In 2003, two countries from East Asia took part and won the first two places. In 2018 there were seven who took the first seven places. A competition in which the challengers are cognitively always on top cannot be won by a constantly deteriorating incumbent.

What caused the US decline? The College Board's annual results of the SAT entrance exams for university studies allow the most accurate assessment of academic ability. Between [2017](#) and [2019](#) Hispanic SAT scores slipped from 487 to 483. Since white test takers have been stagnating at 553, they cannot stop the decline. It is the children of mostly poor immigrants from Asia who prevent an even greater debacle. Their scores have increased from 612 to 637. But they cannot reverse the overall trend, because in 2018 they only provided the USA with 64 newborns out of 1,000, while Hispanic births were [234 out of 1,000](#).

Blacks, who are the third largest group behind Whites and Hispanics with [146 out of 1,000](#) newborns, could reverse the overall trend most easily, due to their demographic strength. To do so, however, they would at least have to overtake Hispanics. Yet, they are falling further behind. Between 2017 and 2019, their SAT scores dropped from 463 to 457, i.e. 25 points below their Hispanic peers.

These results could change, of course. Further educational reforms may produce different results. However, despite a tripling of spending per US child between 1971 and 2012, performance has [not improved](#) at all. The best are as good as decades ago, but their share is shrinking. On the other hand, the proportion of [underachievers](#) is increasing whilst their scores are decreasing.

At the moment, there seems to be nothing that can prevent a further deterioration of US competence. Trump's willingness to change the country follows a painful diagnosis of the problems. But even under Trump, the USA has no way of solving the problem. There are simply not enough skills in the US workforce to reclaim the [3.7 million](#) jobs that were lost to China. The US resembles Germany, which has also irretrievably lost its camera, telephone and computer industries to East Asia. Increasing or even stabilizing cognitive ability is far more difficult than ending wars.

Most of those who hope to do better than Trump have not even seen or acknowledged the problem as clearly as he does. Of course, another president can send troops to global hotspots again or leave them where they are currently stationed. With even less effort, however, a new president can make the southern border – which could be secured only partially – [permeable](#) again.

Indeed, reopening the border would be one way in which the United States could rise to become – after tenth place in 1950 – the number one country in the Latin world. After all, 177 million people want, [calculated for 2020](#), to emigrate from Latin America and the Caribbean. Merkel's Syria fiasco in Germany, which has been ongoing since 2015, could be outdone here by a factor of 100. However, it will only remain limited to these 177 million if the percentage of people willing to migrate calculated for 2017

does not increase. But there is little to suggest that this will happen. In no other region of the world has the desire to emigrate risen more strongly between 2010 and 2017 – by half, from [18 to 27 percent](#) – than in Latin America. What is happening on the subcontinent, which between 1870 and 1930 became a place of hope and future for around [13 million Europeans](#)? At that time, the Old World was groaning under birth rates and war index values, which Latin America had to endure after 1950.

The entire region suffers from premature [deindustrialization](#). Factories that make essential products, which are certainly in demand, have had to close because better and – simultaneously – cheaper goods are available on the world markets. More competent nations respond to such a threat by switching to technologically more sophisticated products, the manufacture of which the low-cost suppliers cannot imitate. However, countries that do not have the highly qualified personnel to make this change are slipping into low-complex services and – if available at all – into the supply of agricultural and industrial raw materials.

However, with China – eleven times Japan, twenty nine times South Korea – the developed *and* the emerging markets are confronted with a supplier that delivers relatively simple goods (kitchen appliances, textiles etc.) and high-tech articles (computers, drones, numerical machines etc.) at the same time in superior quality, quantity and price structure.

Because of China et al., Latin America's domestic peace dividend from the fertility decline to just [two children](#) per woman, and from a war index falling to 2, was therefore only enjoyed for a few decades in the late twentieth century. Having fewer offspring does not meet the Chinese competition any more than larger families did in the past. The big difference is that now it is only sons who are heading north, just as third and fourth brothers did before.

The extent of today's economic and social despair is reflected in the fact that even Chile – famous for its wineries and copper mines – is affected. It is – with fewer than twenty million citizens – the only country in the region that is still raising [one](#)

[mathematically gifted child](#) for every 100 children. In neighboring Argentina, not even the capital Buenos Aires can do as well. Otherwise, however, the region's nations belong to around 170 countries with almost five billion inhabitants worldwide, which – due to a mathematically gifted population of only zero to one percent – will never be able to generate high-tech industries and will therefore lose their few top achievers to some 30 countries – all with a birth shortfall – that are still in the economic race.

While an increasing number of the world's most deprived people want to enter the USA, top experts are already starting to leave the great democracy. Young Chinese are weighing whether in the long term they might not do better at home than in California. Among the 50 states, the former technologically avant-garde region that produced Silicon Valley now ranks only [44th](#) in terms of student achievement. Almost [70 percent](#) of California's children cannot properly calculate or write. The Golden State, however, still holds a first place. Among the Hispanics, it is the unchallenged leader with [16 million](#), ahead of Texas ([11.5 million](#)). Since many of them cannot afford to pay for their pregnancies, already in 2018 a medical poor-relief facility (*California Medical Assistance Program*) pays for [half of all births](#).

None of this can be hidden from foreigners long-term. In the early days of Chinese guest students, only 10 to 15 percent returned home. By 2017, [80 percent](#) of them want to leave the USA again, and by 2020, it's already [86 percent](#). America's appeal vis-a-vis China is no longer proving victorious, even with the lack of freedom in the People's Republic. The USA has also fallen from first to [third place](#) among the destination countries of Germany's best and brightest running for the exits. There, too, the fleeing elite is being replaced by low-skilled foreigners.

The only relatively resilient western security axis – with two nuclear powers – still in place stretches from Canada and the USA via Great Britain to Australia and New Zealand. Four of this quintet – with 140 million people in an area of 18 million square kilometers (in population and surface comparable to Russia) – only allow skilled workers as immigrants, i.e. they're now following the lead of East Asian nations who have never offered passports to low achievers. The four thus joined the small group of

fortresses of competence. They protect their top performers from discouragement by strictly controlling the percentage of aid recipients. This makes them a magnet for foreign elites who lose heart in their home countries by the obligation to finance ever more entitlements. Alone, however, the four Anglos cannot stabilize the system. Western civilization will lose its backbone if the USA continues to march in the opposite direction.

Competent US citizens are – beyond mere resignation – thus faced with the same three options as like-minded people in the EU members, which are slipping even faster, due to the lack of Ashkenazi and Asian top achievers: (1) Populism, i.e. strengthening the borders, at the last minute, so to speak; (2) separatism, i.e. shielding the still competitive areas of the economy from irrecoverable regions; and (3) emigration, i.e. strengthening and defending the existing fortresses of competence which, however, can only remain secure with higher birth rates.

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